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Report on the Latin American economy. First half of 2009
The decline in global demand, which dragged down commodity prices, and the impact of the 
credit crunch, which spread to the emerging economies from mid-September, have brought 
growth in the Latin American economies grinding to a halt, interrupting one of the longest-lasting 
expansions (2002-2008) in their recent history. With a signifi cant degree of synchronisation, activ-
ity in most of the Latin American economies posted negative quarterly rates in Q4, giving rise to 
a reduction in year-on-year growth from 5% in Q3 to 1% (see Table 1). In 2008 as a whole, GDP 
growth was 4.2%, a rate which, while the lowest for the past four years, refl ects the buoyancy the 
Latin American economy enjoyed during the fi rst three quarters of the year. However, more in-
dicative of the current economic pulse is the convergence of the growth forecasts for 2009 to-
wards negative rates, entailing a downward revision of more than 4 pp on the forecasts proffered 
just six months back (see Chart 1). This adjustment is not very different from that experienced by 
the other emerging regions (it is similar to that in Asia excluding China and India, and somewhat 
less than that in eastern Europe); but, seen in perspective, it contrasts with the resilience shown 
by activity in Latin America during the fi rst year of the global fi nancial turmoil.
Against this background, there has been a prompt economic policy response to the deteriora-
tion in the economic situation, with the dual aim of softening the adverse effects on activity 
arising from the credit crunch (see Box 1) and using all the available room for manoeuvre in 
respect of the countercyclical response. Signifi cantly, most of the countries started from a fa-
vourable economic and fi nancial situation, the outcome not only of the external environment 
but also of the macroeconomic stabilisation drive of recent years. This sound starting position 
meant that economic policies could offer some response, despite the diffi culties of the global 
setting, which is in notable contrast to similar situations in the past. Exchange rate fl exibility, 
the sizeable volume of reserves, the improved fi scal position and the reduction of fi nancial 
vulnerabilities were the key props that provided for greater leeway. Although the economic 
policy response has not been suffi cient to avert a far-reaching real and fi nancial adjustment 
(similar to that in the other regions), arguably it has helped mitigate its effect.
It should be highlighted, in any event, that the channels through which the crisis has been 
transmitted to the various countries differ in terms of their relative signifi cance, and that the 
room for manoeuvre has not been equal in all of them. Both circumstances help explain both 
the appreciable differences regarding the scale of the fi scal policy response and the growing 
convergence in the monetary policy area, as is analysed in section 4. Indeed, in many coun-
tries – though not in all – the reduction in fi nancial vulnerabilities attained in recent years has 
provided for a more fl exible use of the exchange rate as an initial external shock absorber, 
eliminating what was a signifi cant constraint on monetary policy in the past and allowing it to 
bear the weight of many of the countercyclical policies in this period (see Chart 1). Conversely, 
the fi scal policy response (see Box 2) may have been limited by two types of constraints: on 
one hand, the fall in revenue and the decline in the primary surplus in some countries; and on 
the other, the external fi nancial constraint, heightened by risk aversion, and which may hold in 
the medium term owing to the increase in bond (public or publicly backed) issues in the ad-
vanced countries.
Infl ation, which was a constant concern in the fi rst half of 2008, has become a secondary 
preoccupation in the last six months, since the weakness of demand and the fall in commod-
ity prices have begun – slowly – to exert infl uence in moderating it and, more importantly, in 
tempering infl ation expectations (see Chart 1). That said, consumer prices (which grew by 
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 March
GDP (year-on-year rate)
Latin America (a) 5.6 5.7 4.2 5.2 5.5 5.7 6.3 5.2 5.5 5.0 1.0
Argentina 8.5 8.7 7.0 8.0 8.6 8.8 9.1 8.5 7.8 6.9 4.9
Brazil 3.7 5.4 5.1 4.4 5.4 5.6 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.8 1.3
Mexico 4.9 3.2 1.3 2.5 2.6 3.4 4.2 2.6 2.9 1.7 -1.6
Chile 4.6 4.7 3.2 5.9 5.5 3.6 3.8 3.4 4.6 4.6 0.2
Colombia 6.9 7.5 2.5 8.5 8.0 6.5 8.0 4.1 3.9 2.9 -0.7
Venezuela 10.3 8.4 4.8 8.8 7.6 8.6 8.5 5.0 7.3 4.1 3.2
Peru 7.6 9.0 9.8 8.8 8.1 8.9 9.8 10.3 11.7 10.7 6.7
Uruguay 7.0 7.8 12.1 6.6 3.9 9.6 9.5 9.8 16.0 13.2 9.5
CPI (year-on-year rate)
Latin America (a) 5.2 5.4 7.9 4.9 5.3 5.4 5.9 6.6 7.7 8.5 8.5 7.4
Argentina 10.9 8.8 8.6 9.5 8.8 8.6 8.5 8.5 9.1 8.9 7.8 6.3
Brazil 4.2 3.6 5.7 3.0 3.3 4.0 4.3 4.6 5.6 6.3 6.2 5.6
Mexico 3.6 4.0 5.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.9 4.9 5.5 6.2 6.0
Chile 3.4 4.4 8.7 2.7 2.9 4.8 7.2 8.0 8.9 9.3 8.6 5.0
Colombia 4.3 5.5 7.0 5.2 6.2 5.3 5.4 6.1 6.4 7.7 7.8 6.1
Venezuela 13.6 18.8 31.4 19.0 19.5 16.2 20.0 26.3 31.0 34.6 33.4 28.5
Peru 2.0 1.8 5.8 0.4 0.8 2.4 3.5 4.8 5.5 6.1 6.6 4.8
Uruguay 6.4 8.1 7.9 7.0 8.1 8.7 8.6 7.7 7.6 7.6 8.6 7.5
BUDGET BALANCE (% of GDP) (b)
Latin America (a) -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3
Argentina 1.8 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.4
Brazil -2.9 -2.2 -1.6 -2.6 -2.1 -2.2 -2.2 -1.6 -1.8 -1.3 -1.6
Mexico 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1
Chile 8.0 8.7 5.0 7.9 8.6 8.7 8.7 9.2 7.2 6.1 5.0
Colombia -3.7 -3.3 -1.7 -3.2 -2.1 -2.4 -2.8 -2.2 -2.5 -2.4 -1.7
Venezuela 0.0 3.0 — -1.3 1.2 0.9 3.0 — — — —
Peru 1.4 1.1 2.2 1.5 1.2 1.7 1.8 2.3 3.1 2.1 2.2
Uruguay -0.6 -0.3 -1.5 -0.8 0.5 1.0 0.0 1.1 -0.3 -1.1 -1.5
PUBLIC DEBT (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) 39.1 33.7 29.9 38.1 37.4 33.9 33.7 31.7 31.0 29.6 29.9
Argentina 64.2 55.5 44.6 61.5 59.1 55.8 55.5 52.4 50.5 46.0 44.6
Brazil 44.7 42.7 35.8 44.7 43.9 43.2 42.7 40.8 40.1 37.8 35.8
Mexico 23.2 21.1 24.5 23.3 23.9 21.2 21.1 21.0 20.7 20.8 24.5
Chile 5.3 4.1 5.2 5.2 5.1 4.4 4.1 3.6 3.9 4.5 5.2
Colombia 44.8 32.9 33.4 42.7 42.2 35.6 32.9 32.6 32.5 32.7 33.4
Venezuela 41.9 22.7 13.5 31.7 29.9 21.2 22.7 20.9 13.6 12.6 13.5
Peru 32.7 29.7 24.1 30.8 29.6 31.4 29.7 27.6 25.3 23.9 24.1
Uruguay 70.9 70.5 57.8 62.6 67.6 68.7 70.6 70.1 68.1 62.5 57.5
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% of GDP) (b)
Latin America (a) 2.0 0.8 -0.4 1.7 1.5 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 -0.4
Argentina 3.6 2.7 2.3 3.5 3.3 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.0 2.8 2.3
Brazil 1.3 0.1 -1.8 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.1 -0.6 -1.1 -1.5 -1.8
Mexico -0.2 -0.6 -1.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.9 -1.4
Chile 4.7 4.4 -2.0 5.9 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.1 1.9 0.0 -2.0
Colombia -1.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.5 -2.8 -3.0 -2.9 -2.2 -2.1 -2.1 -2.8
Venezuela 14.7 8.8 14.3 12.0 10.0 8.8 8.8 11.5 14.7 17.8 14.3
Peru 3.0 1.4 -3.3 3.2 3.0 2.1 1.4 0.3 -1.2 -2.2 -3.3
Uruguay -2.0 -0.3 -3.9 -1.3 -0.7 -1.1 -1.0 -0.3 -3.2 -3.3 -3.9
EXTERNAL DEBT (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) 22.4 21.6 — 22.8 22.9 22.4 21.6 19.9 19.1 18.3 —
Argentina 47.5 47.3 39.1 50.6 50.8 49.2 47.6 46.6 44.6 40.7 39.1
Brazil 16.1 14.7 — 16.4 16.4 15.9 14.7 14.1 13.3 12.8 —
Mexico 13.4 12.6 13.8 13.3 11.5 11.0 12.1 11.6 11.3 —
Chile 32.0 34.0 37.6 32.3 33.0 33.9 34.0 33.4 35.1 37.5 37.6
Colombia 29.5 26.0 — 24.9 25.5 25.3 25.9 18.9 19.0 19.1 —
Venezuela 26.9 24.4 — 25.0 24.3 24.1 24.4 25.0 23.9 21.3 19.6
Peru 28.2 28.7 27.1 28.9 29.5 29.7 29.8 31.6 30.1 28.2 27.1
Uruguay 54.6 52.8 — 50.3 54.7 55.2 52.8 51.2 47.7 43.9 —
80027002
2006 2007 2008
SOURCE: National statistics.
b. Four-quarter moving average.
a. Aggregate of the eight countries represented, except Uruguay.
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 1
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7.4% across the region in March 2009 compared with a year earlier) continued to show no-
table downward stickiness, more so than in other advanced and emerging economies, and 
the depreciation in exchange rates since September may slow the ongoing moderation of 
infl ation rates.
In sum, neither the reduction in fi nancial vulnerabilities nor limited net borrowing have afforded 
suffi cient protection for the Latin American economies from the effects of an international fi nan-
cial crisis that has entailed a strong reduction in external demand, credit restrictions and an 
across-the-board fall in confi dence (see Chart 1). In this setting, some of the region’s traditional 
diffi culties at times of fi nancial volatility – such as access to external fi nancing – have reappeared, 
and certain latent vulnerabilities during the boom period – such as the structural fragility of pub-
lic fi nances – have resurfaced. However, so far no country has seen problems in its fi nancial 
system of the scale and nature of those experienced in the industrialised countries. The question 
is whether the economic policy response will be suffi cient or not – and whether any leeway is 
available – to stave off the risk of fi nancial crisis. Against this background, the extension of bilat-
eral and multilateral fi nancial support may prove a key factor in restoring confi dence.
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a. Seven biggest economies.
b. G20 data for Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. National statistics for the rest.
c. A plus sign (+) denotes positive inflows. A negative sign (-) denotes positive outflows.
CHART 1
CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS TO LATIN AMERICA AND ECONOMIC 
POLICY RESPONSES
BOX 1
The fi nancial crisis originating in the United States impacted Latin 
America following several years of extraordinarily favourable external 
conditions, in which the region was the recipient of sizeable fi nancial 
fl ows from the rest of the world. This box analyses the channels of 
transmission of the crisis to Latin America and the economic policy 
responses adopted.1
After a fi rst year in which the fi nancial turmoil had a limited impact on 
Latin America, the international fi nancial crisis that began in mid-Sep-
tember was felt with great intensity, through the start of a severe 
process of deleveraging. Initially and particularly virulently, this proc-
ess affected the countries with a greater degree of fi nancial integra-
tion, such as Chile, Mexico and, especially, Brazil. As Chart 1 shows, 
the withdrawal of short-term foreign capital in Brazil from October 
amounted to $32 billion. In Mexico, the related amount was $8.1 bil-
lion. That prompted a depreciation of these countries’ currencies 
from their 2008 peak of around 40% against the dollar. In Argentina, 
the downward trend of the currency was more moderate, but non-
fi nancial private-sector capital outfl ows stepped up (almost $9 billion 
in the second half of 2008), and there was a concurrent increase in 
the proportion of dollar deposits to almost 19% of the total, com-
pared with 14% in early September.
Thus, as a result of deleveraging and of the habitual funding markets 
(foreign credit lines, currency swaps) drying up, the period in particu-
lar from October to November saw an appreciable rise in the cost of 
fi nancing in dollars for local fi nancial intermediaries and a signifi cant 
credit restriction in this currency, with a particular impact on trade fi -
nancing. The effects of this restriction were exacerbated by the ha-
bitual increase in the public’s preference for the dollar as a safe-haven 
currency, and – on this occasion – by specifi c factors such as the 
reversal of foreign exchange derivatives transactions by certain non-
fi nancial corporations, which experienced heavy losses (Mexico, Bra-
zil), and uncertainty over the capacity of local banks to refi nance their 
foreign credit lines (Chile, Mexico).
In this situation, central banks took a wide range of measures, aimed 
chiefl y at the following objectives: to mitigate the depreciation of their 
currencies; to ease liquidity pressures and the credit restriction on 
dollars; and to counter the tightening of fi nancing conditions in local 
currency.
To mitigate the volatility of exchange rates, most central banks inter-
vened selling reserves. In Brazil and Mexico, these sales totalled $15 
billion and $19 billion, respectively, on the spot market, while inter-
vention involving exchange rate swaps in Brazil amounted to $32 
billion (see panel 2). A greater relative effort to sustain the currency 
was apparent in Peru, where the degree of exchange-rate fl exibility is 
limited by the high level of fi nancial dollarisation.
There were most considerable measures to increase liquidity in dollars 
in Brazil, where the central bank injected dollars into the interbank 
markets and conducted tenders of this currency to provide credit to 
the export sector and banking system. A mechanism – which has not 
yet been used – was also designed to provide for the refi nancing of 
corporate-sector foreign-currency-denominated liabilities for an 
amount of up to $43 billion. In other countries fi nancial infl ows were 
encouraged by the reduction of foreign currency reserve requirements 
(Peru) and the elimination of taxes on fi nancial infl ows (Colombia). The 
Argentine and Chilean central banks also extended loans in dollars to 
commercial banks to facilitate foreign trade fi nancing.
Overall, in respect of the measures aimed at alleviating local-cur-
rency funding diffi culties, Brazil was also the most active country, 
given that a more severe risk of credit restriction was perceptible 
and there was greater room for manoeuvre. Reductions in bank 
reserve requirements have freed around 40% of the resources im-
mobilised before the start of the crisis, equivalent to more than 
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SOURCES: Bloomberg and Banco Central do Brasil
a. The total value of measures in dollars includes repos in dollars, export financing in dollars, spot sales of reserves and sales of reserves via 
derivatives.
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1. An extensive country-by-country review of these measures can be found in: 
The reactions of Latin American and Caribbean governments to the interna-
tional crisis: an overview of policy measures up to February 2009, ECLAC, 
2009. 
 In the last two quarters of 2008 – especially in Q4 – and at the start of 2009 there was a 
rapid deterioration in the world economy, which moved into what may be characterised as 
a global recession. Following the bout of extreme tension that broke out on the interna-
tional fi nancial markets in mid-September, the world economy saw an unprecedented col-
lapse in activity and trade as a result of the impact of the fi nancial crisis (see Chart 2). The 
annualised quarterly rate of GDP fell by 6.3% in the United States, by around 6% in Europe 
and by almost 13% in Japan. In the main emerging countries there was also a strong cor-
rection in activity, though on occasions not as sharp as in the industrialised countries. In 
China, too, growth in Q4 was far lower than in the previous quarters, and the foreign trade 
indicators showed a signifi cant contraction. In the Asian economies more open to trade, 
both exports and industrial production collapsed at double-digit rates, while in eastern 
Europe the risk of a regional fi nancial crisis increased in light of the scale of their external 
imbalances. Against this backdrop, the growth outlook worsened globally, giving rise to a 
further strong decline in commodity prices from October, of 40% in the case of oil and of 
25% in that of metals, this being a key factor for Latin America.
The situation required resolute monetary and fiscal policy measures, with sizeable cuts in 
official interest rates in the main developed and emerging economies. The Federal Re-
serve lowered its official interest rates on three occasions, from 2% to a range of 
0%-0.25%, moving towards a non-conventional monetary policy framework that entailed 
a most substantial increase in its balance sheet and, moreover, the announced acquisition 
of long-term government debt for an amount of up to $300 billion, with the aim of facilitat-
ing the decline in interest rates. The ECB changed its policy stance and cut its official rate 
on five occasions, to 1.5%. And the Bank of Japan lowered its official rate to 0.10%. The 
flight to quality led US 10-year yields to fall to historical lows of 2% in late 2008, although 
they subsequently stood in a range of between 2.5% and 3%. Heightening risk aversion 
and the search for quality were also reflected on the foreign exchange markets, as high-
lighted by the clearly rising trend of the dollar against most of the emerging and developed 
countries’ currencies, which was only interrupted significantly in March. In this respect 
and for much of the period, the dollar appreciated particularly sharply against some of the 
main eastern European currencies (the Polish zloty, the Hungarian forint and the Russian 
rouble). But currencies such as the Mexican peso, the Brazilian real or the Korean won 
have depreciated by more than 30% since the publication of the October half-yearly Latin 
American report.
Economic and fi nancial 
developments: external 
environment
CHANNELS OF TRANSMISSION OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS TO LATIN AMERICA AND ECONOMIC 
POLICY RESPONSES (cont´d)
BOX 1
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15% of banking system deposits, and changes have also been 
made to cash ratio arrangements to ease the transmission of li-
quidity in the interbank market. The authorities likewise attempted 
to support credit more directly, through injecting 100 billion reales 
(3% of GDP) into the public-sector development bank, and the ap-
proval of legislation allowing public-sector banks to acquire private 
banks. In Chile, the central bank allowed requirements in dollars to 
be covered by local currency. In Colombia bank reserve require-
ments were lowered, and the contractionary effect on liquidity of 
sales of reserves was offset by central bank public debt purchases, 
which were also resorted to in Chile. Argentina, Venezuela and 
Peru reduced reserve requirements in order to provide greater li-
quidity to the banking system. Mexico set in train a programme to 
increase short-term liquidity through interest rate swaps, the repur-
chase of government bonds and the extension of the eligible col-
lateral for borrowing from the Bank of Mexico.
The measures adopted have met some of the objectives for which 
they were designed. Indeed, the use of international reserves has 
proved effective for addressing specifi c problems in foreign trade fi -
nancing, for refi nancing foreign-currency-denominated loans and for 
providing dollars to the fi nancial system. Moreover, from a broader 
perspective, the fall-off in foreign fi nancing has not resulted in a fi -
nancial crisis in the region, which is a signifi cant achievement. How-
ever, government intervention has not been able to counter more 
than partially the severe tightening of credit conditions, and in some 
countries it has not prevented a decline in credit, a situation which 
continues to worsen.
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While recently there has been some stability, the fi nancial markets are far from having returned 
to normal. This stability has largely been due to the swift application of support measures in 
the area of liquidity provision, recapitalisation, the providing of public guarantees and the pur-
chase of troubled assets, which have contributed to sustaining the basic functions of the fi nan-
cial system, but have not restored agents’ confi dence. In the case of the emerging economies, 
an infl uential factor in stabilising the markets was the simultaneous announcements in late 
October by the Federal Reserve and the IMF, respectively, of a liquidity swap facility to Brazil, 
Mexico, South Korea and Singapore, and of a non-conditional short-term liquidity facility for 
countries with sound fundamentals and policies, which was later replaced in March by a more 
fl exible facility (see Box 1). Sovereign spreads, measured by the EMBI+, have returned to lev-
els around 650 bp after reaching 860 bp in late October, a six-year high, while stock markets 
hovered around minimum levels after the slump from July to October (see Chart 2). Region by 
region, the EMBI stood at very similar levels in Latin America, eastern Europe and Asia, al-
though the increase was greater in eastern Europe, where the stock market performance was 
also relatively worse.
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 The aggregate national accounts data for the region as a whole show the strong impact of the 
crisis on Latin America during 2008 Q4, when the economy grew by only 1% year-on-year, 
compared with 5% in Q3 (see Chart 3). Until then, the fi nancial turmoil and the notable slow-
down in the developed countries had only had a limited effect on the region. However Mexico 
and, to a lesser extent, Colombia, which were both ahead in the regional business cycle, had 
already experienced an appreciable slowdown in previous quarters, attributable essentially to 
the tightening of their monetary policies and to the subsequent decline in external demand. 
Nonetheless, there were abrupt and synchronised quarter-on-quarter declines in practically all 
countries in the region (–2.6% on aggregate) in 2008 Q4 (see Chart 3). At the end of the year, 
then, Chile was technically in recession according to the defi nition of two consecutive quarters 
of negative growth, and the rest (except Peru) were on the verge of recession. Brazil, whose 
growth accounted for more than 2.5 pp of the region’s overall year-on-year growth to Q3, saw 
its contribution decline to only 0.5 pp, while Mexico’s contribution was negative for this same 
amount. The region’s very moderate year-on-year growth in Q4 was thus based on the contri-
bution of Argentina, Peru and Venezuela.
During the fi rst year of turmoil, Latin America showed notable resilience. There was some 
consensus that this was based on very positive terms of trade, the reduction of fi nancial vul-
nerabilities achieved in recent years and the reduced reliance on external fi nancing, aspects 
which are interrelated to some extent. If this resilience was somewhat unexpected, so too was 
the abruptness of the current adjustment, which in some countries (Brazil and Peru) has en-
tailed a decline in GDP growth of between 4 and 5 pp, in terms of the year-on-year rate, in only 
one quarter, and an even bigger fall in domestic demand. Conceivably, therefore, although the 
real channel was the dominant one for the transmission of the crisis from the start of the tur-
bulence in most countries (including Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Colombia), its effect 
was slow and belated (in some cases a whole year) in fi ltering through to growth, owing to the 
soundness and to the inertia of domestic demand. However, from September, the sharp wors-
ening in the international economic situation, the interaction of the fi nancial transmission chan-
nel – through the credit crunch – with the real channel (in particular, the collapse of external 
demand and of commodity prices) and confi dence effects have all resulted in a much more 
immediate and virulent impact on activity in only one quarter than in the whole of the previous 
year. It is illustrative here that the composition of GDP growth in the region in Q4, where the 
adjustment of domestic demand is on such a scale that it accounts for only 2.2 pp of year-on-
year growth, compared with almost 7 pp in Q3 (see Chart 3). The negative contribution of 
external demand to growth was moderately corrected by the slowdown in imports (from 14.5% 
in Q3 to 2% in Q4), despite the strong decline in exports (–6.2% year-on-year), which is a 
further sign of the intensity of the adjustment.
Component by component, the biggest adjustment was in gross capital formation (which 
grew by 2.6% year-on-year, against 14.3% in Q3). This is the most cyclical component 
and is habitually affected most directly by changes in the availability and cost of financing. 
In addition, there was a fall in the price of commodities which, in the case of Latin Ameri-
ca, are linked to a substantial portion of industrial investment (see Chart 4). This slowdown 
in investment was across the board, but particularly pronounced in the biggest South 
American economies (Argentina, Brazil and Chile), where this demand component had 
been more dynamic in recent years. However, perhaps the most salient development was 
the strong slowdown in private consumption (which increased by 1.7% year-on-year, 
compared with 5.3% in Q3), which was particularly evident in Mexico (posting negative 
rates), Brazil and Chile. The incipient deterioration in the labour market indicators, espe-
cially in Brazil and Mexico, the weakness of remittances flows, the change in the credit 
cycle, the worsening growth outlook and, in sum, the collapse of confidence are expected 
Activity and demand
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to make for an unfavourable outlook for consumption. Indeed, the higher-frequency indi-
cators point to a possible intensification of the slowdown in 2009 Q1: industrial production 
was falling at a quarterly moving average rate of 10% in January, the biggest decline since 
2002, while retail sales are slowing strongly and tax revenue is growing less than expected 
(see Chart 5).
This means that the factors which might a priori help mitigate the weakness of domestic 
demand (the expected fall in inflation, the cut in official interest rates, the restoring of 
credit thanks to public-sector backing and an expansionary fiscal policy stance) do not so 
far seem to be sufficient. Indeed, interest rates on credit have been raised in many coun-
tries (incorporating higher risk premia), credit to the private sector is slowing and new 
credit it is falling in the countries for which data are available (see Chart 5).
One key factor behind this deterioration in the economic outlook was the parallel collapse in 
imports and exports in the second half of the year. This was due, in part, to the decline in com-
modity prices from July (around 60%) and to the high component of import recycling business 
in the exports of several countries (Mexico, among others). Imports, which grew at a rate of 
close to 40% on average for the region in the fi rst half of 2008, posted a negative rate of over 
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10%, while exports underwent a turnaround from growth of 25% to a negative rate of –20% 
(see Chart 6). The scale of such rates is evocative of the slowdown in foreign trade in com-
mercially more open areas, such as emerging Asia. Consequently, the negative contribution to 
growth of external demand fell, albeit only moderately; only in countries such as Venezuela 
(greatly affected by the decline in oil prices and more dependent on imports) and Argentina did 
the negative contribution of the external sector to growth increase. Against this background, 
the current surplus for the region as a whole has disappeared, following the declining trend in 
train since a peak was reached two years back. Chart 6 shows that the external position of all 
the countries is in defi cit, except in Argentina and Venezuela.
 The global fi nancial crisis in mid-September marked a key turning point for the region’s fi nan-
cial markets. Although there had been a signifi cant correction on stock markets and fi xed-in-
come markets since the summer, as a result of portfolio investment outfl ows, October and 
November saw bank fl ows and the usual funding sources practically dry up, along with a size-
able increase in the cost of bank and non-bank fi nancing, and a sharp rise in the preference 
for the dollar. As Chart 1 shows, there was an abrupt reversal in Q4 in gross infl ows in the re-
gion’s four main economies (such infl ows having amounted to more than $40 billion on aver-
age in the fi rst three quarters of 2008). These turned into capital outfl ows of almost $30 billion, 
despite the more favourable and countercyclical behaviour of foreign direct investment, which 
partly offset the fall-off in “other fl ows” (around $50 billion).
In this setting, the currencies of the countries with the highest degree of fi nancial integration (Bra-
zil, Mexico and Chile) depreciated by close to 40% from their peak exchange rate in 2008 (see 
Chart 7). But their recent trajectory shows differentiated trends: the exchange rate of the Brazilian 
real has tended to stabilise, supported by central bank sales of reserves; the Chilean peso has 
appreciated (by 10% since mid-October); and the Mexican peso has fl uctuated both ways, de-
preciating to mid-March (10%) and recovering thereafter. The downward movement was related 
to the vulnerability perceived in the Mexican economy owing to its ties to the United States and 
to doubts about its capacity to fi nance its current account defi cit. Such doubts were alleviated 
from March further to the access to the IMF’s new fi nancing facility and to the Federal Reserve’s 
swap facility. The Argentine peso, the exchange rate of which had held very stable since the start 
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of the turmoil, trended gradually downwards from October, recording a cumulative deprecia-
tion of 12%. The recent depreciation of exchange rates, measured in real effective terms (see 
Chart 6), shows a relatively generalised correction in the strong appreciation accumulated in the 
previous years, except in the case of the Venezuelan bolivar. In the case of the Mexican peso, a 
signifi cant depreciation from the levels of three years earlier can be seen.
Sovereign spreads and implied CDS premia, after widening most substantially from mid-
September to mid-October, have trended unevenly from country to country, highlighting 
some risk discrimination by the market. Thus, the sovereign spreads and CDS of Argen-
tina and Venezuela have continued widening and reached a high, discounting a high prob-
ability of default. In the remaining countries, although CDS premia remained high, there has 
been some narrowing from the levels reached after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, 
standing at around 300 bp in Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Colombia, and closer to 200 bp 
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in Chile, whose solvency was acknowledged with a further upgrading in March. In con-
trast, Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador saw their ratings downgraded in this period (see 
Chart 7).
Finally, stock markets tended to stabilise and practically recover in full from late October, fol-
lowing the sharp declines (of around 40%) in the previous months. Hence, although volatility 
was marked, since October the main markets have picked up by around 15% in the cases of 
Brazil and Chile, but also in those of Venezuela and Peru. The Argentine, Colombian and 
Mexican markets held at levels closer to those in October.
Set against these developments, it is estimated that capital fl ows to Latin America in 2009 
could fall most sharply: they would account for approximately one-third of net fl ows received 
in 2008 and eightfold less than in 2007, including a sizeable decline in foreign direct invest-
ment, habitually considered as the most stable source of fi nancing (see Chart 8). Sovereign 
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and corporate issues fell signifi cantly in the second half of 2008 and in early 2009. However, 
one positive aspect is that issuers such as Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Colombia have maintained 
access to international markets in this period, and they might already have met their fi nancing 
needs for 2009 (and part of 2010 in some cases). The perception of greater refi nancing risk 
has focused on private-sector issues, whose substantial maturities in dollars this year (see 
Chart 8) might have to be rolled over, in part, on local – and habitually narrower – debt markets, 
or through resort to bank credit. In any event, this refi nancing risk is estimated to be somewhat 
less than in other emerging regions and might be partly alleviated by multilateral (IDB, IMF and 
WB) and bilateral fi nancial support.
 Following the sizeable increase in headline and core infl ation rates from early 2007, running through 
well into 2008 (up to a peak of 8.8% year-on-year in October in terms of the regional aggregate), 
both indices have begun to ease off in recent months (7.4% in March), albeit only moderately and 
with substantial differences from one country to another (see Chart 9). In Chile, the infl ation rate fell 
appreciably, by more than 4 pp from October 2008 to 5% year-on-year in March, after fi ve months 
of negative fi gures. At the other extreme, infl ation in Venezuela has shown downward stickiness 
and stood at 28.5% year-on-year in March, only slightly below its 2008 peak. At an intermediate 
point are countries such as Mexico (6% in March) and Brazil (5.6%), where infl ation has begun to 
ease only slowly, despite the intensity of the fi nancial and real shock they underwent.
The fall in commodity prices is the main determinant of the easing in consumer prices in most 
of Latin America and, generally, worldwide, just as their acceleration in the previous phase was 
due to rising commodity prices. However, this easing off has been much more notable in the 
prices of energy than of food, which perhaps helps explain why the moderation in consumer 
prices has been slower in emerging economies, as in Latin America, where the weight of food 
in the CPI basket is greater and where the presence of energy consumption subsidies re-
stricted the pass-through of the rise in oil prices to consumer prices (and now it should have 
prevented, in a symmetrical fashion, a clearer pass-through to a decline in the infl ation rate) 
(see Chart 9). The existence of some market power in the setting of prices, as a determinant 
of their downward stickiness, has also been a concern in some countries.
Notwithstanding, the deterioration in the terms of trade and the effect on aggregate demand 
in Latin America as a commodity-exporting region make for a signifi cant change in the outlook 
for infl ation in the coming months. In this respect, though there are risks arising from the exist-
ence of pass-through effects given the sharp depreciation in exchange rates in recent months, 
so far there have been no discernible pressures on import prices, production or the consumer 
prices of unprocessed food (the odd exception aside) that give credence to a clear concernin this 
connection. Conceivably, therefore, the moderate improvement in infl ation expectations in re-
cent months in most countries – that should be attributed, above all, to the deterioration in the 
growth outlook and to the forecast of extensive output gaps in the coming quarters – should 
restrict to some extent the upside risks to prices.
In terms of interest-rate cuts the monetary policy response was very cautious until the end of 
the year, in contrast to that in the developed countries, in a context in which the evidence of 
a turnaround in infl ation was insuffi cient (see Table 2). However, monetary policy in recent 
months has been characterised by its use of a broader range of instruments than the interest 
rate. Accordingly, in order to analyse the effort in easing monetary conditions, it may prove 
misleading to focus exclusively on interest-rate movements. In particular, in October and 
November, when the exogenous contraction of monetary and credit conditions became more 
acute, most central banks in the region (notably Brazil, but the others too) set in train a wide 
range of measures in order to mobilise available resources to mitigate the effects of the 
Prices
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credit contraction, with particular emphasis on facilitating the provision of dollars. Without 
intending to be exhaustive, Box 1 reviews some of these measures. In addition to the use of 
reserves to moderate exchange-rate volatility, central banks took measures in many different 
areas, supplemented in some cases by action by fi nance ministries. These included most 
notably: export credit (Brazil and Argentina); the refi nancing of banking or corporate sector 
liabilities through the provision of dollars (Brazil, Mexico and Chile); the extension of local-cur-
rency-denominated liquidity provision, through the lowering of reserve requirements (Argen-
tina, Brazil, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela); broadening the range of collateral acceptable to 
the central bank (Mexico and Argentina); and the fi nancial reinforcement of public-sector 
banks to promote credit (Brazil and Chile).
The cycle of offi cial interest rate reductions in the region began only in December, when 
Colombia made its fi rst cut (of 50 bp, to 9.50%), two months after the concerted reduction 
in interest rates by the Federal Reserve, the ECB and the Bank of Japan in October. Chile 
was next, with an unexpectedly strong cut of 100 bp in January. And Mexico and Brazil 
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followed suit, with cuts of 50 bp to 7.75% and 100 bp in February, respectively. Further 
cuts ensued, meaning that the cumulative decline to mid-April amounted to 650 bp in Chile 
and 250 bp in Brazil (in both cases entailing a complete reversal of the cycle of rises initi-
ated in 2008 and, despite this, expectations remain on the downside), 300 bp in Colombia, 
225 bp in Mexico and 150 bp in Peru. In this respect, it is worth highlighting the conver-
gence ultimately seen among the countries pursuing infl ation targets (fi rstly with Chile and 
Brazil, and after with Colombia, Mexico and Peru), as they have moved towards an accel-
eration of the cycle of interest-rate cuts as a monetary policy response, as opposed to a 
more gradualist approach, although in all cases infl ation has stood to date above or in the 
upper range of the infl ation targets (see Table 2). In this sense, Mexico and Peru, which 
appeared to have opted for a more gradual management of offi cial interest rate cuts, 
changed their strategy. Mexico made a second cut of only 25 bp, but then took a surprise 
step with a third cut of 75 bp in March and a further 75 bp in April. Peru made a 100 bp cut 
in April, in light of the signs of the slowdown intensifying. Finally, in the countries not pursu-
EXTERNAL CAPITAL FLOWS AND REFINANCING
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ing infl ation targets (Argentina and Venezuela), monetary policy was steered by different 
considerations. The Argentine central bank held its interest rates unchanged despite some 
decline in the offi cial measurement of infl ation, although it implemented measures for great-
er liquidity provision, while the Bank of Venezuela shaved 2 pp off its reserve requirement 
in local currency and its regulated lending and deposit interest rates.
On the fi scal policy front, the key feature was the announcement of a series of relatively 
expansionary fi scal packages, as analysed in Box 2. In this respect, although revenue de-
clined strongly in most countries at the start of the year, the fi scal indicators (fi scal bal-
ances, debt ratios, interest burden) continued to evidence until end-2008 a relatively fa-
vourable position. Nonetheless, the cyclical slowdown and the announced fi scal responses 
augur a clear deteriorating trend during 2009.
During the second half of 2008 and the opening months of 2009, there was no substantial 
headway in structural reform, against a background in which policy measures were condi-
tioned by the immediate response to the crisis. Brazil set up a sovereign wealth fund, equiva-
lent to around 0.5% of GDP, which will be used to contain potential crises, to fi nance Brazilian 
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companies’ operations abroad and to guarantee government investments. In Venezuela, the 
nationalisation programme continued in the rice distribution sector, and fuel distribution in the 
country was granted on an exclusive basis to the State oil company. In Argentina the private 
management companies of pension funds were nationalised, with their resources being trans-
ferred to Social Security Funds. In Bolivia the new constitution, backing greater State interven-
tion in the economy, was approved by referendum.
Trade integration processes were also affected by the new global economic context. In 
MERCOSUR, three of the four members announced the possible application of pre-import 
licences, or of measures protecting local industry. If implemented, such measures could 
reduce trade within the group. On the positive side, an initiative was launched for trade 
between Brazil and Argentina to be conducted in local currency. On 1 February, the Free 
Trade Agreement between Peru and the United States came into force, while Bolivia for-
went the US trade preference arrangements granted under the ATPDEA programme.
One particularly important area for international economic policy in recent months has been 
the G20 meetings, of which Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are part, and in which Spain has also 
participated. This forum has seen headway in international reform and cooperation, and means 
the region can better convey its interests at a time of diffi culty such as the present. Its partici-
pation has contributed to the adoption of certain proposals conducive to the interests of the 
emerging economies, such as the increase in the IMF’s fi nancial capacity by up to $750 billion, 
the provision of funds for the reactivation of trade fi nancing via multilateral banks and the crea-
tion of a new, more fl exible lending facility, which Mexico and Colombia have already request-
ed. Brazil and Peru have likewise acknowledged that they consider this facility useful, but have 
stated they do not intend to use it for the moment.
 The Brazilian economy sustained a high growth rate in 2008 Q3 (6.8% year-on-year), but was 
severely affected by the deterioration in the international fi nancial setting from mid-September. 
The economy contracted 3.6% in quarter-on-quarter terms in 2008 Q4, which entailed a no-
table decline in its year-on-year growth rate to 1.8%. However, growth for 2008 as a whole 
was 5.1%. The slowdown was principally due to domestic demand, the contribution of which 
to growth fell to only 3.2 pp from 9.2 pp in Q3, and particularly to investment (3.8% year-on-
year, against 20% the previous quarter). Private consumption was also impacted, its year-on-
year growth rate dipping to 2.2%, from 7.3% in Q3. Conversely, the negative contribution of 
external demand to growth fell slightly (to –1.8 pp from –2.4 pp of GDP in Q3), but there was 
a strong fall in exports (–7%) and a notable slowdown in imports (7.6%, against 22.8% in Q3). 
Against this background, the indicators for 2009 Q1 point to a continuation of the recession 
Countries
80027002
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Brazil                      Yes                 4.5 ±               Yes                      5.9                   4.5 ±                 4.42
Mexic                     Yes                 3 ± 1 No 6.5 3 ± 1 4.05
Chile No 3 ± 1 No 7.1 3 ± 1 2
Colombia No 3.5 a 4.5 No 7.7 4.5 a 5.5 5
Peru No 2 ± 1 No 6.7 2 ± 1 3
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a. Inflation expectations for 2009 from the reports of central banks and private institutions.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2009 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. FIRST HALF OF 2009
and show clear signs of deterioration in the labour market. Along with diminished external 
demand, the chief impact of the crisis for the Brazilian economy has stemmed from the higher 
cost of and restricted access to credit, in particular to companies and for export (see Chart 
11). Accordingly, the central bank intervened promptly, tempering the volatility of the exchange 
rate and providing liquidity in dollars and in local currency through various mechanisms. The 
measures adopted averted the collapse of credit to the export sector, although they were not 
suffi cient to prevent a strong increase in the cost of fi nancing and a reduction in the fi nancial 
resources available. Turning to the external sector, the ongoing deterioration of the current ac-
count continued, with a worsening of the trade balance which, in part, was mitigated by the 
improvement in the income balance. There were also fi nancial outfl ows from mid-September 
which led the central bank to intervene using substantial sales of reserves. Infl ation remained 
high throughout the second half of 2008, close to the upper ceiling of the central bank’s target 
(4.5% +/–2%), as a result of domestic demand pressures and food prices, although infl ation 
expectations have tended to ease and to move closer to the mid-point of the range (4.5%). 
Consequently the central bank, despite the fact the infl ation fi gures do not indicate a clear 
downward trend, opted to cut interest rates by 100 bp at its January meeting and by 150 bp 
at its March meeting, placing them at 11.25%. As regards fi scal policy, the year 2008 closed 
MAIN INDICATORS OF PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
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with a surplus of 4.1% of GDP, higher than the target of 3.8% of GDP. In January, however, 
some deterioration in public fi nances was discerned. This is due in part to lower revenue, and 
partly to agreed increases in current expenditure. Unlike in other countries in the region, Brazil 
has not announced a large-scale fi scal plan, despite having selectively cut taxes and reduced 
its primary surplus target to 2.5% (see Box 2).
Activity in Mexico slowed strongly in the second half of 2008, given that GDP growth aver-
aged zero in year-on-year terms, against 2.7% in the previous half-year period. In Q4 there 
was a strong adjustment in activity. GDP fell by 2.7% in quarter-on-quarter terms (7% year-
on-year) owing to the contraction in private consumption (–1.3% year-on-year). Interna-
tional trade also felt the impact of the crisis, since exports fell at a year-on-year rate of 8.8%, 
and imports by 7.7%. Infl ation increased by more than 2 pp during the second half of 2008 
to 6.5% in December, a six-year high and 2.5 pp above the Bank of Mexico’s maximum 
range. This was chiefl y as a result of food price developments (see Chart 11), although sec-
ond-round effects were also evident since the core infl ation rate rose from 5.1% to 5.7% on 
a year earlier. Between January and March infl ation declined slightly, although the rate (6.1%) 
is still far higher than target. In this setting, infl ation expectations, measured by the Bank of 
Mexico’s monthly survey, trended upwards, to over 4% (the upper limit of the target corridor) 
for 2009 and 2010. These indicators, combined with the notable depreciation of the peso, 
posed a monetary policy dilemma, in a setting in which activity and the international environ-
ment were worsening substantially. At the four monetary policy meetings held in 2009, offi -
cial interest rate cuts were announced: 50 bp in January, 25 bp in February and 75 bp in 
March and April, to 6%, which appears to highlight the growing weight that the output gap 
has had in the authorities’ reaction function. The measures taken, along with the agreement 
by pension funds to invest only in domestic securities in 2009, the possibility of access to 
the IMF’s new fl exible facility ($47 billion) and the announcement by the Federal Reserve of 
a liquidity swap facility, have been conducive to a considerable recovery by the exchange 
rate since mid-March. Regarding the external sector, the current-account defi cit widened 
notably in the second half of the year, standing at 1.4% of GDP in 2008. This was due to the 
deterioration in the trade balance, arising in turn from a collapse in exports (led by fuel and 
automobiles), which had been relatively robust during the fi rst nine months of the year. The 
adverse trend of remittances prompted a strong decline in transfers, while inward foreign 
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FISCAL POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS BOX 2
Latin American governments have responded to the global crisis not 
only with monetary and foreign exchange policy measures (see Box 1), 
but also with the implementation of fi scal plans, many of which contain 
measures involving fi nancing to strategic sectors. This box seeks to 
examine three facets of this response: relative to the response provid-
ed by other economies; from a historical perspective; and across the 
other countries in the region. In addition, a summary of the main meas-
ures adopted in several of the region’s economies is given.
Firstly, from an international perspective, the size of the fi scal pack-
ages announced in Latin America, measured as a percentage of 
GDP, is signifi cantly below that observed in other regions (1.3% in 
average weighted terms for the fi ve economies represented) (see ac-
companying panel), although in international comparisons such as 
this it is diffi cult to apply uniform concepts. Likewise, they are, on 
average, below the IMF’s broad recommendation that fi scal expan-
sions equivalent to 2% of GDP be implemented in those countries 
with the capacity to do so, although there are signifi cant cross-coun-
try differences. For example, the amounts relating to the plans of two 
very open economies highly dependent on revenue from commodi-
ties (such as Chile and Peru) are above both the average and this 
recommendation. In this respect, one difference between the plans 
announced in Latin America and those of other countries is that the 
former focus their efforts on the current year (2009), while in the latter 
countries – especially in the developed economies – the announced 
stimulus is usually apportioned out over several years. In terms of 
composition, the measures announced in Latin America appear, by 
comparison, to have more features supportive of domestic consump-
tion and to include a sizeable proportion of measures geared to fi -
nancing companies and exporters (normally through the reinforce-
ment of public-sector banks). This may be due, on one hand, to the 
general absence of automatic stabilisers in the region and, on the 
other, to the consideration of the export sector as strategic in most 
countries.
Secondly, from a time perspective, this is the fi rst time that countries 
in the region are facing a crisis with some capacity to implement a 
countercyclical fi scal policy. As the accompanying panel shows, fi scal 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2009 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. FIRST HALF OF 2009
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
US ChinaJapanSpainAust. Can. ChileKorea UK NZ Peru Russ.Mex. Arg. Swed. Pol. Braz. India
1  VOLUME OF FISCAL PACKAGES (a)
% of GDP
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 199 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
 CHANGE IN GDP
 PRIMARY BALANCE (right-hand scale)
2  FISCAL STIMULUS IN LATIN AMERICA
% of GDPRate of change y-o-y (%)
0
20
40
60
80
100
Int. public
debt/tax
revenue
Debt
service/exports
Short-term
debt/reserves
(b)
Sovereign
spread (c)
Public
debt/GDP
External
debt/GDP
 1996 1999  2002
 2004  2008
3  VULNERABILITY INDICATORS
%
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
Mexico Brazil Colombia Chile Venezuela Peru Argentina
 LATEST
 BUDGETS
4  GROWTH FORECASTS
Year-on-year rates (%)
SOURCES: Banco de España and national statistics.
a. As % of GDP. Includes packages announced and/or approved, irrespective of the timing. Excludes all financial support measures. 
b. Excluding Argentina.
c. In standardised bp.
1. Enrique Alberola and José Manuel Montero (2006), Debt Sustainability and 
Procyclical Fiscal Policies in Latin America, Documentos de Trabajo, no. 0611, 
Banco de España.
FISCAL POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS (cont´d) BOX 2
policies, proxied by the primary balance as a percentage of GDP, 
have tended to be procyclical in the region. Following the Asian and 
Russian crisis (1998), or during the more recent phase of instability 
(2001-2002), the public-sector primary balance increased or held 
stable, denoting that fi scal policy was unable to exert a countercycli-
cal effect, as a result of the high fi nancial and fi scal vulnerability.1 
However, growth in the past cycle and the stabilisation policies pur-
sued in the region in recent years have made for a more favourable 
starting position, refl ected in lower external and public-sector vulner-
ability, which provides some leeway to pursue an expansionary policy 
in the current circumstances. The foregoing would also allow readier 
access to both domestic and external fi nancing under relatively more 
favourable conditions, as the recent sovereign issues on international 
markets by Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Peru would show.
In this respect, and from a regional perspective, the fi scal response of 
the Latin American countries to the crisis is far from uniform. Possibly, 
this diversity depends both on the intensity and nature of the shock 
each country has undergone and on the headroom for and limits to 
current borrowing capacity. Against this background, Chile is the only 
country which has been able to put a forceful countercyclical fi scal 
policy into practice, resorting to the prior saving in its Economic and 
Social Stabilisation Fund, which had accumulated up to 12% of GDP. 
As the accompanying table indicates, the announced plan in Chile 
would amount to $5.9 billion (3.6% of GDP), of which 2.8% of GDP 
might be considered fi scal policy in the strictest sense (tax cuts, 
spending on investment and transfers, and capitalisation of the State 
copper company, Codelco). The rest of the package comprises 
measures offering fi nancial support to SMEs and exporters, and cap-
italisation of the State Bank. The programme is funded drawing on 
accumulated saving, although bond issues have also been author-
ised under the 2009 budget.
A similar case would be that of Peru, although its countercyclical re-
sponsiveness is considered to be somewhat less. A fi scal stimulus 
plan for approximately $3,850 million (3.4% of GDP) has been an-
nounced. It focuses on an increase in public spending (2.5% of GDP), 
although some measures were already included in the 2009 budget. 
Funding would be based partly on access to multilateral loans.
In Mexico, the room for manoeuvre is more limited owing to the lack 
of public-sector saving. But Mexico’s access to international markets 
and to multilateral loans has enabled it to provide for fi scal stimulus 
on a considerable scale (1.4% of GDP). Mexico set out two plans: the 
fi rst in October (the fi rst plan submitted by an emerging economy) 
and the second at the beginning of the year, the main measures of 
which are an increase in public spending on infrastructure, a freeze 
on or reduction in energy charges, and an increase in public-sector 
employment.
Argentina has announced an expansionary fi scal policy ($3.5 billion, 
1.3% of GDP). The fi scal package consists essentially of a public 
spending impulse (investment in infrastructure). In light of the lack of 
access to international markets, almost half the necessary funding 
would be from fi xed-term deposits that had been held by the AFJP 
(the management companies of retirement and pension funds) – and 
which are now administered by Social Security Funds – and from the 
rollover of fi xed-term funds and bills held by Social Security Funds.
Brazil and Colombia are two of the countries that have submitted 
more limited fi scal packages. This may be related to greater fi scal 
vulnerability, given their higher public debt and fi nancial costs, and in 
Brazil’s case with the fact that the credit restriction is the main prob-
lem facing it. Indeed, Brazil is the country in the region which has put 
forward the smallest stimulus in terms of GDP (excluding Ecuador), 
equivalent to 0.9% of GDP. However, Brazil has deployed sizeable 
resources to support the BNDES (National Development Bank) – 3.5% 
of GDP – and has recently reduced its primary surplus target for 2009 
to 2.5% of GDP. To offset the effect of the fi scal package, the Treasury 
has announced a freeze on primary spending at 1.2% of GDP.
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direct investment in the second half of the year fell by half. Public fi nances were virtually in 
balance (–0.1%) and the government devised two fi scal stimulus plans, which overall might 
be equivalent to 1.4% of GDP (see Box 2).
In Argentina the economy grew by 7% in 2008, the sixth consecutive year of growth. However, 
there was a signifi cant slowdown during the year, especially in the fi nal quarter, with growth 
running at a quarterly rate of –0.3% (and at an annual rate of 4.9%). There was a notable loss 
of momentum in investment, although private consumption also slowed. The negative contri-
bution of external demand to growth increased once again in Q4, albeit without reaching the 
amount recorded in previous quarters. The volume of both exports and imports declined in 
that quarter. During 2008, the current account balance posted a surplus of 2.3% of GDP, only 
marginally below the related fi gure in 2007. The trade surplus widened by 21%, but was offset 
by a bigger defi cit in the other items. Offi cial measurement of the CPI revealed an easing of 
infl ation during the year. The calculations by provinces or by private institutions indicate a 
similar moderating profi le, but with higher infl ation rates. Turning to public fi nances, the growth 
rate of tax revenue moderated in Q4 owing to the slowdown in activity and, especially, to the 
fall in agricultural commodity prices. Until Q4, the favourable trend of such prices (and the sale 
of stocks built up during the agricultural dispute) contributed to sustaining the government’s 
primary surplus, despite the considerable increase in public spending, which was largely due 
to transfers to the private sector to contain prices in sectors such as energy, transport and 
food. To ease the redemptions and interest relating to public debt maturing in the period 2009-
2011, the government carried out a debt conversion enabling capital maturities to be ex-
tended to 2014. The government further reformed retirement arrangements, eliminating the 
private pension system and transferring funds to the public pay-as-you-go system; a portion 
of these funds is being used by the government to reactivate credit to the private sector. The 
effects of the international crisis on Argentina were essentially manifest in a reduction in export 
prices, in a marked decline in share and bond prices (which had already been infl uenced by 
domestic uncertainty) and in the diminished supply of credit (even though an economy with 
relatively low levels of credit is involved here). In turn, the global fi nancial crisis halted the gov-
ernment’s plans to regain access to foreign credit by means of the cancellation of the Paris 
Club debt and the reopening of the government bond exchange programme launched in 
2005. The government adopted several measures to face the crisis, including most notably 
the approval of legislation to promote the repatriation of funds held by residents abroad, the 
FISCAL POLICY RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS (cont´d) BOX 2
Finally, Venezuela acted chiefl y to restrict the loss of revenue aris-
ing from the fall in oil prices, to uphold the public stimulus policy 
that sustained activity in 2008. In this respect, announcements 
have been made on a rise in the VAT rate, a 6.7% cut in administra-
tion expenses and a public-sector investment plan totalling $225 
billion between 2009 and 2013 (11% of GDP each year), which is 
expected to be funded by international reserves and by a signifi -
cant increase in domestic government debt issues.
In sum, most of the Latin American countries have been able to 
withstand the decline in activity with signifi cant fi scal stimuli. That 
said, such stimuli have, on average, been on a lesser scale than in 
other emerging and developed economies, meaning that their fi s-
cal policy might be moderately countercyclical in 2009, an unprec-
edented occurrence in the region. Nonetheless, beyond this initial 
reaction, the fi scal position is subject to notable limitations and 
risks. On one hand, there is a possibility that tax revenue has been 
overestimated in the budget, given the current economic slow-
down. In this respect, the accompanying panel shows the differ-
ence between the growth forecasts in the respective budgets and 
the latest consensus forecasts released by analysts: there are no-
table differences in the cases of Mexico, Venezuela (exacerbated, 
moreover, by the projection of a $60 per barrel oil price, far above 
the present market price) and Brazil (the elasticity of whose reve-
nue to the cycle is very high). On the other hand, from the stand-
point of fi nancing, the diffi culties of global fi nancial markets and the 
avalanche of issues by the industrialised countries to fund their 
own fi scal and fi nancial plans might restrict the access of these 
countries to fi nancing. Conversely, the IMF’s new fi nancial facilities 
may offer some support in this setting.
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reduction of labour costs and a fi scal package focusing chiefl y on investment in public works 
and equivalent to close to 2% of GDP (see Box 2). The central bank entered into a currency 
swap agreement with the Central Bank of China for an amount of 38 billion pesos, which will 
be in force for three years.
In Chile, the economy moved into recession in the second half of 2008, with negative quarter-
on-quarter growth rates of 0.8% and 2.1% in Q3 and Q4, respectively. The authorities reacted 
to this situation with a forceful fi scal and monetary expansion. In Q4, year-on-year growth was 
scarcely 0.2%. This was the result of the collapse in domestic demand, which declined from 
double-digit growth to contraction at the end of the year, owing to the slump in private con-
sumption and investment in machinery and equipment. Exports declined strongly and imports 
posted negative year-on-year growth rates, albeit on a lesser scale. The outcome was the 
emergence of trade defi cits in the last two quarters of 2008, against the background of the 
worsening terms of trade and a current account defi cit (around 2% of GDP in 2008), despite 
lower outfl ows in respect of factor income. The budget surplus trended in parallel with produc-
tion and the price of copper, leading it to post a surplus of 5.2% of GDP in 2008, but in Q4 the 
budget surplus was zero. A high budget defi cit is projected for 2009, since it is expected these 
trends will continue and – thanks to Chile’s capacity to pursue a countercyclical fi scal policy 
– that a fi scal plan will be implemented for an amount close to 3% of GDP (see Box 2). This 
plan has been supplemented in recent weeks by measures to stimulate credit. Infl ation was on 
the verge of 10% in year-on-year terms, far exceeding the central bank target (3%), but there 
was a turnaround from November, with notable declines in the year-on-year rate (which stood 
at 5% in March). The central bank reacted to the fall in infl ation and to the decline in activity 
with greater-than-expected cuts in offi cial interest rates, for a total of 650 bp at four meetings, 
placing the offi cial interest rate at 2.25%. Finally, in this diffi cult global setting, it was most no-
table that Moody’s should upgrade Chile’s sovereign debt rating from A2 to A1, citing the 
economy’s resilience in the face of external shocks and the solvency of its public sector.
In Colombia, the slowdown in the economy continued during 2008 Q3, with growth of 2.9% 
year-on-year. The deceleration steepened in Q4, and there was a contraction of 0.7%. The fi nan-
cial crisis had a notable impact on the country’s fi nancial conditions, giving rise to fi nancial out-
fl ows and a strong depreciation in the currency. Although the central bank had eliminated the 
taxes it had introduced on short-term capital infl ows and sold moderate amounts ($500 million 
in total) of reserves to control exchange rate volatility, the peso depreciated. Despite the slow-
down in domestic demand, infl ation remained high and above the central bank target in the 
second half of 2008, ending the year above 7% (the target was in the 3.5%-4.5% range). In any 
event, the gradual convergence of infl ation expectations and core infl ation towards the central 
bank target (5% +/–0.5%), in conjunction with the lower growth outlook, enabled the central 
bank to initiate a cycle of interest-rate cuts which, after two 50 bp cuts and one 100 bp reduc-
tion, placed the offi cial rate at 8%. On the fi scal front, Colombia’s reaction was much more lim-
ited than that of its neighbours (see Box 2), probably due to its worse public fi nances position. 
However, the authorities ensured the fi nancing of Colombia’s external debt for the current year 
(partly through market issues, and partly through multilateral agencies) and undertook a debt 
conversion that lengthened the attendant maturities, which has eased the risks in this fi eld.
In Peru, activity slowed in 2008 Q4 to 6.8% compared with the same period a year earlier. 
Nonetheless, growth for 2008 as a whole was 9.8%, the highest rate in the region. The slow-
down in Q4 was essentially due to the deceleration in domestic demand, since the negative 
contribution of the external sector held at around 3 pp, as in previous quarters. As regards the 
external accounts, the current account ran a defi cit of 3.3% of GDP in 2008, compared with 
the surplus of 1.1% in 2007. The defi cit was the result of the progressive deterioration in the 
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trade balance, which recorded a defi cit in Q4 for the fi rst time since the beginning of 2002, 
owing to the slowdown in exports, the relative strength of imports and the deterioration in the 
terms of trade. And this despite the partial offsetting effect of lower profi ts at foreign compa-
nies, which repatriated fewer funds abroad. The rise in infl ation continued in the second half of 
2008, and this variable ended the year far above the central bank target, and began to ease 
only in early 2009. To face the international fi nancial crisis, the central bank adopted a series 
of measures to increase liquidity in the fi nancial system. Nonetheless, the Peruvian currency 
has depreciated gradually against the dollar in recent months. Moreover, at its meetings in 
February and March, the central bank cut its offi cial interest rates by 25 bp, but the related cut 
in April was for 100 bp, to 5%. The budget surplus in 2008 was 2.1% of GDP, against 3.1% in 
2007. In an attempt to withstand the slowdown in activity, a fi scal plan equivalent to around 
2.5% of GDP (see Box 2) was approved.
In the second half of the year, Venezuela posted average growth of 3.7% year-on-year (4.1% 
and 3.2% in Q3 in Q4, respectively), marking a notable slowdown in growth in the fi rst half of 
the year, weighed down by the collapse of oil prices. The current account posted a defi cit of 
$4.5 billion in 2008 Q4, the biggest defi cit in the time series, as a result of the fall in exports to 
one-third of their value. As to public fi nances, the growth of spending quickened substantially 
from Q2 and once again outpaced revenue. Despite the announcement of highly ambitious 
investment plans (see Box 2), it appears fi scal policy may be restricted in 2009, with a 6.7% 
cut in spending and a 3 pp rise in VAT. On the price front, the infl ation rate reached 36% in 
October 2008, falling progressively thereafter to 28.5% in March. The price of food and bever-
ages accounts for a large portion of these high rates. The abrupt deterioration in the current 
account balance and the fi scal policy stance underscore the fi scal dependence on oil in this 
economy and the diffi culties it faces in the current circumstances.
17.4.2009.
